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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(j) ("orders, 
judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not 
have original appellate jurisdiction."). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: The district court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
defendants on the basis of collateral estoppel. 
Standard of Review (as to all issues): In reviewing the grant of a motion for 
summary judgment, the appellate court gives no deference to any finding by the trial 
court, Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989); Schurtz v. BMW 
ofN. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991), but essentially reviews the case de 
novo, being free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions, Barber v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch, 751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah App. 1988); Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 
(Utah 1991), applying the same standard as that applied by the trial court, Durham v. 
Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah 
App. 1987). Because disposition of a case on summary judgment denies the benefit of a 
trial on the merits, the appellate court must review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and may affirm only where it appears that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where, even according to the facts as 
contended by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
Barber, 751 P.2d at 251; Winegar, 813 P.2d at 107. 
Determinative law (as to Issues 1 and 2): 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" (Emphasis added). Jackson v. 
Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982) (A genuine issue of fact exists where on the 
basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant's 
conduct measures up to the required standard). Young v. Felornia)f 121 Utah 646, 648, 
244 P.2d 862, 863 (Utah 1952) (If there exists any genuine issue of material fact, a 
motion for summary judgment must be denied). Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342, 343 
(Utah 1978); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803, 803 (Utah 1991). 
Issue No. 1A: The trial court erred in finding that the elements of 
collateral estoppel were met in the instant case, in that application of collateral 
estoppel to the facts of this case violates the purposes behind the Workers 
Compensation Act, by forcing an injured worker to either avail himself of the 
exclusive remedies of the Workers Compensation Act against the employer or the 
civil litigation remedies against the non-employer third party, but not both. 
i. The requirement that the issues in the first trial be identical to 
those in the second case is not met here, 
ii. The Utah Workers Compensation Act was instituted to 
provide a quick, informal remedy for injured Utah workers, 
iii. Workers compensation proceedings are far different from and 
serve different purposes than civil litigation. 
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iv. The workers compensation scheme does not anticipate nor 
provide a "full and fair" lawsuit resulting in a "final judgment 
on the merits" that precludes a subsequent third-party suit. 
v. The Utah Workers Compensation Act expressly permits a 
separate action against a third party - not a bar against such 
an action, 
vi. By forcing an injured worker to make an election of remedies 
of either workers compensation or third-party litigation, the 
district court's erroneous reading of the law defeats the 
purposes behind the Utah Workers Compensation Act. 
Issue No. IB: Application of collateral estoppel to this case violates 
the "open courts" provision of the Utah Constitution. 
Issue No. 1C: Application of collateral estoppel to the facts of this 
case is manifestly unjust. 
Issue No. 2: The trial court erred in determining that because "Plaintiffs 
have failed to produce evidence that Del Ozone's ozone generator was defective," 
Del Ozone was entitled to summary judgment. 
Issue No. 2A: The district court erred in denying Plaintiffs' Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(f) motion for additional time to adduce evidence in opposition to Del 
Ozone's motion for summary judgment. 
Standard of Review (as to Issue No. 2A): Denials of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) 
motions are decided on an "abuse of discretion" standard. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 
3 
If 29, 16 P.3d 540, 547 (2000); Price Dev. Co. v. Or em City, 2000 UT 26, \ 9, 995 P.2d 
1237, 1243 (2000). 
Issue No. 2B: The district court erred in determining that Plaintiffs 
had failed to introduce evidence that Del Ozone's ozone generator was defective. 
Issue No. 3: The June 4, 2008 (Second) Notice of Appeal from the district 
court's final judgment issued May 28, 2008 was timely as to all parties and issues in this 
case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural summary. 
This appeal is from the Order Granting Summary Judgment dated May 28, 2008, 
(Record on Appeal - hereafter ROA - 1845, attached hereto as Appendix A), appealed 
herein on June 4, 2008 (ROA 1848). In that order, the district court certified that order as 
the final judgment of the court on the entire matter, as follows: 
"This Ruling and Order shall constitute the final Order of the Court on this matter. 
No further Order need be submitted by the parties." 
(ROA 1846). 
Factual summary. 
In December, 2004, Wendy Gudmundson worked as a supervisor at the Wasatch 
Laundry Facility of the Utah State Prison (run by the Utah Department of Corrections). 
(ROA 487-490). In mid-December, 2004, an ozone generating system - intended to 
boost water and cleaning efficiency through the injection of ozone into the laundry water 
(ROA 435) - was installed at the prison laundry. Within days after the system 
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commenced operations, Mrs. Gudmundson began to suffer severe, debilitating headaches, 
(ROA 495-505, 605). She also developed brain swelling, (ROA 612), chemical 
encephalopathy, multiple chemical sensitivity, vagal maladaption, (ROA 685), weight 
loss, (ROA 509:111) fatigue and other physical pain. Ultimately, she underwent brain 
surgery to remedy a Chiari malformation [a defect that causes the brain to impinge 
downward on the spinal column]. (ROA 278). She continues to suffer medical problems 
to this day. She has suffered a significant brain injury, which has rendered her totally 
unable to perform her normal work and daily activities. (ROA 1791). 
The ozone generating system had been designed in part by Del Ozone (ROA 
544:12-13; 549:31), and contained parts purchased from Del Ozone (ROA 545:16-17; 
ROA 549:30-31). OzoneSolutions supervised the installation of the system, (ROA 
550:35; ROA 552:44-45), under the supervision and control of Johnson Controls, Inc. 
(ROA 241; ROA 552:45 - 553:46). Johnson Controls had a contract with the Utah 
Department of Corrections to install the ozone system. (ROA 414:24-25). Johnson 
Controls subcontracted with OzoneSolutions to install the ozone system. (ROA 548:27-
28; 549:30-32). 
Ozone, the chemical used in the system, is a powerful oxidizing agent in air and 
water disinfection. It generally exists as a gas and is highly chemically reactive. (ROA 
537-539) Ozone is closely regulated by the US Environmental Protection Agency, in 
part, because when combined with naturally occurring organic matter in water it creates 
known disinfection byproducts such as total trihalomethanes, haloacetic acids, bromate 
and chlorite, that pose serious health hazards. See Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"), 
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42 U.S.C.S. § 300j-9(i)(2)(A) (2008); See also National Primary Drinking Water 
Regulations: Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts, 63 Fed. Reg. 69,390, 69,398-
69,435 (1998) ("Explanation of Final Rule"). The EPA warns that ozone as a water 
disinfectant creates byproducts from organic material (in the water or laundry) that have 
shown to be neurotoxic, as well as toxic or carcinogenic to most organ systems. See id. 
See also ROA 635-644, Peter Dowideit & Clemens Von Sonntag, Reaction of Ozone with 
Ethene and Its Methyl- and Chlorine-Substituted Derivatives in Aqueous Solution, 32 
Envtl. Sci. Tech. 1112(1998). 
The laundry room at the Utah State Prison did not have the recommended six (6) 
air changes per hour ("ACH") for the ozone system. (ROA 557:62). Prior to installing 
and starting the ozone laundry disinfection system, OzoneSolutions did not verify that the 
prison laundry facility had the requisite ACH, nor did OzoneSolutions inform prison 
authorities that six ACH were required. (ROA 549:33-550:34). The OzoneSolutions 
ozone laundry disinfection system installed in the prison did not have an ambient ozone 
monitoring devices to signal when ozone levels are in excess of EPA and OSHA 
regulations. (ROA 559:70). See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9, 50.10; See also Encyclopedia of 
Occupational Health & Safety 45.10 (Jeanne Mager Stellman et al. eds., 4th ed., 
International Labor Office 1998) (ROA 588). Even after ventilation was put in to try and 
control ozone levels, the ambient ozone levels continued to exceed OSHA and EPA 
levels. Ultimately, the ozone laundry disinfection system was shut down and, to date, has 
not been restarted. (ROA 590; ROA 592-593; ROA 595-599). 
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Del Ozone knew that the ozone generator and other key Del Ozone components 
used in the system in question was to be shipped to "Utah Department] 0[f] 
Corrections], Draper Prison, 14425 Bitter Brush Lane, Draper, Utah 84020." (ROA 
601). 
After the installation of the ozone system, at least one other prison employee 
working in the laundry department, Adrian Jesse Manzanares, also suffered symptoms 
after exposure to the ozone system. (ROA 711-712). A couple of inmates who worked in 
the laundry (whose identity has not been ascertained to this point) also complained of 
headaches from the ozone system. (ROA 412:15-16; ROA 415:26). 
On May 13, 2005, Mrs. Gudmundson filed a workers compensation claim with the 
Utah Labor Commission for medical expenses and disability benefits. (See ROA 281). 
In accordance with the statutes regulating workers compensation, this claim was her 
exclusive remedy against her employer. See Section 34A-2-105, Utah Code Ann. It was 
processed in accordance with the applicable statutes and regulations, which provide for 
an abbreviated and limited process - time limits on the presentation of evidence; medical 
reports submitted in lieu of testimony subject to cross-examination; limited discovery and 
limits on attorneys fees, among other limitations. See, generally, Utah Admin. Code r. 
602 and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-802(l). 
Because the worker's compensation system is set up to expedite the award of 
benefits to an injured worker, most applicants do not develop a worker's compensation 
case as they would a personal injury lawsuit. (ROA 1779). In general practice, once a 
case is filed, the Labor Commission requires the employer and its insurance carrier to 
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respond within 30 days. Once an answer has been submitted, notice of a date for a 
hearing is set, usually three to four months from the date of the notice. No later than 45 
days before a hearing, the parties are required to file a disclosure statement with the 
Labor Commission indicating all witnesses who will testify and the evidence that will be 
submitted at the hearing. (ROA 1775-1776). 
Medical experts are not allowed to testify nor undergo cross-examination at a 
worker's compensation hearing. Instead, written reports are submitted in advance of the 
hearing as part of a joint medical exhibit. Hence, supportive reports of the applicant's 
doctors, and the opposing reports of the defense doctors are included in that exhibit. 
When there exists a medical controversy in a worker's compensation case, the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) will send the case to a "medical panel" to review and 
report to the ALJ on the medical issues. The "medical panel" reviews the medical records 
and then reports to the ALJ. There is no cross-examination of the "medical panel" nor, 
for that matter, of any medical "expert" whose evidence, presented entirely in writing, is 
presented before the panel. (ROA 1777-1778). The "medical panel" report will trump 
any other expert opinions, so long as there is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the panel's conclusions. (ROA 1780). Most Labor Commission hearings last only an 
hour to an hour and a half, with most of the time being taken up by lay testimony, 
including the injured worker. (ROA 1778). 
Given these limitations, it is extremely rare for an applicant's attorney to take the 
deposition of a defense doctor. (ROA 1776). Similarly, it is rare for an applicant's 
attorney to hire their own medical expert, due mainly to financial considerations. (ROA 
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1776). The applicant usually has no money to pay for a special expert, and often medical 
insurance coverage issues limit primary medical treatment. An applicant's attorney is 
often left with trying to "get a report from whoever is available and willing to write a 
report." (ROA 1777). Some complex cases (in which, for example, a worker has been 
exposed to toxins in the workplace, as opposed to a common low back or knee injury), 
are considered to be "works in progress," in that it takes time and continued medical 
testing to determine what is wrong with the injured worker. (ROA 1778-1779). In those 
types of cases, it is not always clear early on what is causing the worker to be ill, and an 
initial assessment by a treating physician may not be correct as to the actual illness that 
the worker is suffering. (ROA 1778-1779). In such cases, counsel for the applicant may 
not have all of the information or medical workup that they would like. Nonetheless, 
most clients simply press their workers compensation attorney to move forward with the 
workers compensation matter because of their financial circumstances. Often the worker 
and the attorney "just have to hope for the best when the case gets before a medical 
panel." (ROA 1779). 
The standards for review of medical and other evidence are different in Labor 
Commission matters than litigation in the district courts. The standards of Daubert do 
not apply to a worker's compensation hearing. Hearsay evidence is not restricted as it is 
under the Utah Rules of Evidence. (ROA 1179-1780). Of course, there is no jury in an 
administrative Labor Commission proceeding. 
In Mrs. Gudmundson's case, the Labor Commission considered a medical report 
from an "Independent Medical Evaluation" performed by Edward B. Holmes, M.D., 
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which concluded that Mrs. Gudmundson's medical condition was not caused by "the 
December 17, 2004 exposure to ozone." (ROA 618). He specifically concluded that he 
found it "highly improbable" and "not medically reasonable" that Mrs. Gudmundson's 
brain swelling leading to the Chiari Malformation was caused by ozone exposure (ROA 
295), despite his notation in his records of a letter dated June 28, 2005, from Dr. Howard 
Reichman of the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, (who had actually treated Mrs. 
Gudmundson), had stated that "ozone exposure was responsible for brain swelling and 
that the lumbar puncture allowed a negative pressure to develop in the spinal canal 
which, in turn, allowed the tonsils [the Chiari Malformation] to drop." (ROA 292-293; 
emphasis in original). The commission also considered the opinion of Dr. Joseph Jarvis, 
who could not "opine a medical causal connection." (ROA 349-350; ROA 283). 
Ultimately, the Labor Commission denied Mrs. Gudmundson's claim, stating in its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, dated October 2, 2006 (ROA 281, et. 
seq.): 
The preponderance of evidence does not support a medical causal connection 
between the petitioner's exposure to ozone and the Chiari Malformation for which 
she was treated. Dr. Jarvis, acting as a neutral medical panel evaluator with 
expertise in occupational medicine, could not opine a medical causal connection. 
Dr. Holmes, also an expert in occupational medicine, reviewed the medical 
literature and the medical records of this case and was unable to correlate the 
ozone exposure and the petitioner's medical condition. 
The petitioner's medical condition was not caused or aggravated by her exposure 
to ozone at work in December 2004 while employed by the respondent, State of 
Utah, Department of Corrections. 
(ROA 283). 
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Mrs. Gudmundson appealed the Labor Commission's decision to the Utah Labor 
Commission's Appeals Board on November 2, 2006. (ROA 322). That appeal was 
denied by way of an "Order Affirming ALJ's Decision," (ROA 357 et. seq.\ which cited 
the Labor Commission's decision that "denied Ms. Gudmundson's claim on the grounds 
that her medical problems were not caused or aggravated by her work-related exposure to 
ozone during December 2004," (ROA 357), with the following finding: 
[T]he existing facts, which are fully supported by evidence that was actually 
presented and accepted into the record, fully support the medical panel's opinion. 
In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that the medical panel's report and, in 
turn, Judge Harm's decision, are supported by the evidence adduced during the 
evidentiary proceedings in this matter. The Appeals Board finds no sufficient 
reason to reopen the evidentiary proceeding. The Appeals Board therefore affirms 
Judge Hann's denial of Ms. Gudmundson's claim. 
(ROA 358). 
In accordance with Section 34A-2-106, Utah Code Ann., which allows claims 
against non-employer third parties arising from industrial injuries, Mrs. Gudmundson, 
along with her husband, Kay, commenced the action that is on appeal before this court, 
against Del Ozone and OzoneSolutions, by way of a complaint filed September 20, 2005. 
(ROA 1). The complaint was later amended on November 6, 2006, to add Johnson 
Controls, Inc. as a defendant. (ROA 100). 
Some discovery was undertaken in the case, including the depositions of Doug 
Wright, facilities coordinator at the Utah Department of Corrections (ROA 408), George 
Eddleman, former laundry employee at the Utah Department of Corrections (ROA 466), 
the plaintiff, Wendy Gudmundson (ROA 481), and John Downey, part owner of 
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OzoneSolutions (ROA 541). Additionally, there were requests for production of 
documents and interrogatories. Evidence has been adduced and made part of the record 
that demonstrated that Mrs. Gudmundson's injuries were in fact caused by exposure to 
the ozone laundry disinfection system and that, contrary to the findings of the Utah Labor 
Commission, such injuries arose from exposure to ozone and to chemical byproducts (the 
Utah Labor Commission's findings were limited to "ozone exposure" alone, with no 
mention or consideration of the chemical byproducts that also injured Mrs. Gudmundson 
(ROA 283)). For instance, Dr. Kay H. Kilburn, designated by Plaintiffs as an expert 
witness, (ROA 660), diagnosed Mrs. Gudmundson with: "(1) Chemical encephalopathy 
due to ozone and other chemicals; (2) Multiple chemical sensitivity; (3) Vagal 
maladaption - nearly fixed heart rate; (4) Chiari malformation with herniation relieved 
surgically; (5) No history of seizures." (ROA 685). He then concluded: 
Ms. Gudmundson worked as a supervisor in the prison laundry for four years 
without difficulty. She was a correctional officer for 9 years. She had exposures 
to chlorine, phosphoric acid, sodium hydroxide sulfide and hydrofluorosalacic 
acid. A new ozone bleach process was installed in the laundry. Within 10 days of 
this new exposure, she developed severe headaches, cramping, dehydration, 
dizziness, vomiting and sought emergency care. During work-up of these 
problems a Chiari malformation was found and surgically corrected. Many 
medicines were given for headaches, which are not abated. When I evaluated her 
on April 3, 2007, she had five impairments of function including balance, reaction 
time, vibration, and hearing. Her most disabling problem is profound chemical 
sensitivity that makes ordinary life impossible because she must avoid many 
scents and chemicals and building [sic]. Chemical sensitivity has continued since 
2004 and is most probably permanent. The sequence of events is explained best by 
ozone inhalation producing increased absorption of it and the background 
chemicals: chlorine, phosphoric acid, sodium hydroxide, hydrofluorosalic acid-
fluorine and resmethrin, a pyrethroid insecticide, and detergents that caused 
intolerance to many chemicals manifested by headache, reduced sense of smell, 
memory loss, dryness of skin and mucous membrane. This made Wendy 
Gudmundson totally and permanently disabled. 
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This expert opinion is rendered to the legal standard of more probable than not. 
(ROA 686; emphasis added). 
In addition, expert witness Douglas E. Rollins, M.D., Ph.D. opined: 
It is my opinion that Wendy Gudmundson's exposures to the ozone laundry 
purification while she worked at the Wasatch Laundry facility exposed her to 
ozone and to the disinfection byproducts catalyzed by the ozone. These substances 
resulted in the severe, intractable frontal headaches that resulted in her admission 
to the Timpanogos Hospital on December 20, 2004. 
(ROA 688, 692; emphasis added). 
On August 28, 2007, nearly two years after the instant action was originally filed, 
new plaintiffs' counsel was substituted into the case (ROA 219), after Mr. and Mrs. 
Gudmundson's original lawyers withdrew (ROA 210). Within three weeks, on 
September 10, 2007, counsel for all of the parties had a telephone conference to discuss 
the status of the case. In that conversation, the Gudmundsons' new counsel noted that the 
fact discovery deadline of September 5, 2007, had passed, although the parties had 
scheduled the deposition of Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Reichman for December 11, 2007 -
some three months into the future and a month past the time that the parties had stipulated 
for the expert discovery deadline. (ROA 534; see also ROA 525-526). In that 
conversation of September 10, 2007, Plaintiffs' counsel candidly informed opposing 
counsel that they needed time to get up to speed on the case and conduct further 
discovery, and requested a nine-month extension to conduct fact discovery, and three 
additional months to conduct expert discovery. Counsel for Johnson Controls and 
OzoneSolutions stated that they would not oppose a Plaintiffs' motion for a new 
scheduling order, since they themselves needed additional time to conduct discovery. 
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Counsel for Del Ozone objected to any extension of discovery timelines, however. (ROA 
534). 
That same day, September 10, 2007, Del Ozone moved for summary judgment 
(ROA 297), arguing that Mrs. Gudmundson's claims were barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata and/or collateral estoppel. (ROA 234-235). In that connection, Del Ozone 
argued that the Utah Labor Commission's determination constituted a final judgment on 
the merits of Mrs. Gudmundson's claim of injury, which had been "completely, fully and 
fairly litigated." (ROA 234-235). Del Ozone further asserted that was no basis upon 
which to impose any duty on it because it, the manufacturer of the ozone generator, could 
not foresee that it would cause Mrs. Gudmundson any harm (ROA 231-232), that the 
ozone generator was not defective (ROA 232-233) and that there was no evidence that 
Mrs. Gudmundson's injuries were caused by ozone (ROA 233). Johnson Controls soon 
followed suit in filing a motion for summary judgment, (ROA 299), as did 
OzoneSolutions (ROA 370). Johnson Controls' and OzoneSolutions' arguments were 
limited to the assertion that collateral estoppel precluded Mrs. Gudmundson from 
attempting to prove causation of her damages in a separate third-party lawsuit. (ROA 
308-319 [Johnson Controls]; ROA 1333-1334 [OzoneSolutions]). 
Plaintiffs opposed the motions for summary judgment on the basis that the 
application of collateral estoppel to this case undermined both the letter and spirit behind 
the Utah Workers Compensation Act, (Section 34A-2-101 et. seq., Utah Code Ann.), 
violated Utah public policy and was in any case manifestly unjust. Plaintiffs also argued 
that the elements of collateral estoppel were not met in this case, inasmuch as the case 
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before the court was not identical, but was fundamentally different from, the case 
presented to the Labor Commission, since convincing evidence had been adduced that 
Mrs. Gudmundson had indeed been injured as a result of ozone exposure and chemical 
byproduct exposure. (ROA 389-400; ROA 1406-1433). 
As to Del Ozone's argument that it owed no duty to Wendy Gudmundson, 
Plaintiffs argued that Del Ozone's manufacture of a defective product and its introduction 
of that product into the stream of commerce to foreseeable users, such as Mrs. 
Gudmundson, precluded its dismissal. (ROA 393). 
In this connection, Plaintiffs also asked for additional time to conduct discovery in 
order to adduce further evidence in opposition to Del Ozone's motion, in accordance with 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). (ROA 373, et. seq.). Among the items that Plaintiffs indicated 
they needed to conduct discovery on were 1) the interpretation of Mrs. Gudmundson's 
MRIs, taken in December, 2004, June, 2006 and again in August, 2006; 2) information 
on the neurotoxicity or carcinogenic effects of an ozone water disinfectant system; 3) 
information on water being pulled from a geo-thermal well below the Utah State Prison 
which had not been metered or quantified, as required by an EPA water permit (ROA 
387); and 4) further information from Del Ozone relating to Del Ozone's denial of 
whether any of its "instruments that are similar to the Device in question [the ozone 
generator at the Utah State Prison] have ever been known to cause a health problem as a 
result of the use or improper use of said similar device," in response to interrogatories 
from Plaintiffs. (ROA 388). Plaintiffs also pointed out that they needed to take the 
depositions of various Del Ozone personnel, including Rick Salter, Jim White and Joel 
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Peterson, or compel documents to supplement Del Ozone's inadequate and deficient 
answers to interrogatories and document requests. (ROA 392-393). In that regard, 
Plaintiffs pointed out that the need for further discovery was not a "fishing expedition," 
in that two of the three defendants in the case had agreed that they needed to take further 
discovery as well. In light of these factors, as well as the entry of new counsel into the 
case, Plaintiffs argued that an extension of time for further discovery under Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(f) was warranted in the case. (ROA 393). This argument was accompanied by an 
affidavit of Plaintiffs' new counsel, referencing the above-stated factors, and stating that 
he had exercised due diligence to become familiar with the facts at issue in the case, and 
stating affirmatively that more time was needed to conduct additional fact discovery and 
expert discovery. (ROA 533-534). 
A hearing was held on the motions for summary judgment on March 3, 2008. 
District Court Judge Denise Lindberg commenced the hearing by announcing that she 
had already made up her mind that the moving defendants would win and that the 
Plaintiff would lose, but indicated that the Plaintiffs could nonetheless be heard if they so 
desired. (ROA 1889:6-1889:7). In so doing, the court rejected Del Ozone's argument 
that "the connection between its role as a manufacturer of the ozone system is so 
attenuated to the injury of the worker in this case, Ms. Gudmundson, that it was 
unforeseeable." The court did, however, agree with Del Ozone that "the plaintiff 
presented no evidence that the ozone generator was defective." (ROA 1889:6). 
Nonetheless, the court announced that "most importantly I agree - and this last round is 
really the basis also for my ruling on Johnson Controls' motion - that issue preclusion 
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applies. So for that reason I believe that Del Ozone's argument and Johnson Controls' 
argument has merit, and summary judgment should be granted on those grounds." (ROA 
1889:6). After oral argument, the court denied Plaintiffs' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) request, 
and granted the motions filed by Del Ozone and Johnson Controls, Inc., ordering that 
counsel for Del Ozone prepare an order to that effect. (ROA 1327). Judge Lindberg 
stated that she would consider OzoneSolutions' motion at a later time, since its motion 
was defective in that it was not accompanied by a memorandum that the court found 
sufficient. (ROA 1889:41). 
OzoneSolutions filed a memorandum in support of its motion for summary 
judgment on March 4, 2008, incorporating the arguments that had been made by Johnson 
Controls. (ROA1328), to which Plaintiff responded on March 14, 2008 (ROA 1406). 
Counsel for Johnson Controls prepared a written order with regard to the summary 
judgment in favor of Del Ozone and Johnson Controls only, to which Plaintiffs objected. 
(ROA 1802). Notwithstanding the objection, the trial court signed Del Ozone's order on 
March 24, 2008. (ROA 1813; attached hereto as Appendix B). 
The district court's order of March 24, 2008, denied Plaintiffs' request for 
additional discovery under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f), stating that they had failed to establish 
that they had been unable to submit evidence to oppose summary judgment. In this 
regard, the district court noted that Plaintiffs had had two and a half years to "uncover 
any available evidence to support their claims." (ROA 1812). [Actually, less than two 
years had elapsed between the time the complaint had been filed and the date that Del 
Ozone's motion for summary judgment had been filed]. In its order, the district court 
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neither acknowledged nor apparently considered the fact that Plaintiffs' new counsel had 
been in the case a mere eight days before the fact discovery deadline expired, and a mere 
12 days before Del Ozone filed its motion for summary judgment. Nonetheless, a hand-
written note from Judge Lindberg - one among many written in the margins of the 
Plaintiffs opposition to Del Ozone's motion for summary judgment, (found at ROA 
388), is telling. Paragraph 24 of that opposition reads, "Plaintiffs recently retained new 
counsel and, therefore, need additional time to perform fact and expert discovery. See 
Exhibit X Affidavit of Rick S. Lundell." (ROA 388). Judge Lindberg's hand-written 
note, written in the left-hand margin next to that paragraph, states, "Too bad - Ct. 
unlikely to grant a 3 extension on this case where P's have been represented by 
competent counsel throughout case & discovery has proceeded w/o interruption." (ROA 
388). 
The district court's order of March 24, 2008, also stated that "Plaintiffs have failed 
to produce evidence that Del Ozone's ozone generator was defective," (ROA 1812) and 
went on to state that the plaintiffs were precluded from pursuing their claim "by the 
doctrine of issue preclusion," finding that "Plaintiffs had a complete, full and fair hearing 
before the Utah Labor Commission," (ROA 1812), the order from which had made a 
finding that the Plaintiffs symptoms were not the result of exposure to ozone, "the 
identical issue of causation upon which plaintiffs' present claims hinge." (ROA 1813). 
Thus, the order concluded, "the elements of issue preclusion have been satisfied and Del 
Ozone's and Johnson Controls' motions for summary judgment on this ground are hereby 
GRANTED." (ROA 1813). 
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That order did not make any express or implied determination that there was no 
reason for delay, nor did it provide an express direction for the entry of a final judgment 
as to the adjudication of all of the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
Instead, that order granted summary judgment to only two of the three named defendants; 
Del Ozone and Johnson Controls, Inc. (ROA 1813). On April 2, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a 
notice of appeal of that order, (the First Notice of Appeal) and specified that the appeal 
went only to the dismissal of Del Ozone and Johnson Controls, and that it did not apply 
to OzoneSolutions, whose motion for summary judgment was still pending. (ROA 
1815). By letter dated April 17, 2008, the Supreme Court gave that appeal the number of 
Appellate Case No. 20080320. (ROA 1836). 
In accordance with the direction of the district court at the earlier summary 
judgment hearing, OzoneSolutions, the only defendant left in the case, filed its 
memorandum of points and authorities to its motion for summary judgment on April 11, 
2008 - after the notice of appeal in Appellate Case No. 20080320 had been filed. 
On May 12, 2008, the Supreme Court issued an order electing to retain the appeal 
on the Supreme Court's docket rather than the Court of Appeals. (ROA 1843). 
On May 28, 2008, the district court issued its Ruling and Order Granting 
Defendant OzoneSolutions' Motion for Summary Judgment. (ROA 1845; Appendix A). 
In it, the district court incorporated by reference its prior analysis as reflected in the 
earlier summary judgment order that "Plaintiff had a complete, full and fair hearing 
before the Utah Labor Commission ... ." (ROA 1845). Despite this finding, the district 
court conceded in a footnote that "Ms. Gudmundson apparently now has physician 
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testimony to challenge the Commission's determination that her medical issues were not 
caused by ozone exposure." (ROA 1845). The district court apparently believed that this 
evidence countering the Commission's findings should not be considered by the district 
court in the instant case, but should be directed solely to the Labor Commission, stating 
"[hjowever, there is no claim that she [Mrs. Gudmundson] has taken the matter back to 
the Commission." (ROA 1845). The district court then confirmed that "the Court has 
already determined that the Commission's procedures were sufficiently trial-like to say 
that the issue in the first action was 'completely, fully, and fairly litigated,'" - despite the 
presence of evidence that challenged the Commission's findings - and that thus 
OzoneSolutions, "much like Del Ozone, is entitled to summary judgment on res judicata 
grounds." (ROA 1846). It was only at this point that the district court specifically 
directed entry of a final judgment in the case, stating that the Ruling and Order "shall 
constitute the final Order of the Court on this matter" and that "no further Order need be 
submitted by the parties." (ROA 1845-1846). 
On June 4, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal from the May 28, 2008 Ruling 
and Order, (hereafter the "Second Notice of Appeal") and moved that the appeal be 
consolidated with the appeal on file; Appellate Case No. 20080320. (ROA 1848). 
On June 25, 2008, the Supreme Court issued an order in Appellate Case No. 
20080320 on a sua sponte motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, stating that "the 
appropriate cure for a premature appeal is a timely appeal that pertains to all aspects of 
the judgment the Appellants wish to challenge." (As mentioned, Appellate Case No. 
20080320 only applied to two of the three defendants and did not involve a final order of 
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the court). Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed Appellate Case No. 20080320 
"without prejudice to any subsequent timely appeal." (ROA 1852). 
The next day, June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court filed a submission of the sua 
sponte motion, with a notation that the order had been issued. (ROA 1851). That same 
day, on June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court sent a letter advising that the Second Notice of 
Appeal - appealing the May 28, 2008 "final Order of the court" - had been filed, and 
assigned it Appellate Case No. 20080537. (ROA 1854). 
On June 28, 2008, Plaintiffs, in an abundance of caution, filed yet another "Notice 
of Appeal" (the "Third Notice of Appeal"), in which Plaintiffs noted that they had 
already appealed from the May 28, 2008 order within seven days of its issuance - on 
June 4, 2008 - but wished to make sure, in light of the somewhat confusing letter 
Plaintiffs counsel had received, that it was clear that the Second Notice of Appeal 
pertained to all outstanding issues and parties in the case, and had been timely filed. To 
the degree that the Third Notice of Appeal was unnecessary, Plaintiffs indicated that it 
should be stricken. If there was any question of the timeliness of the Second Notice of 
Appeal as to all issues and all parties, Plaintiff requested that the Third Notice of Appeal 
nonetheless be considered timely under URAP 22(d) and URAP 4, including any 
extension necessary based on good cause or excusable neglect (ROA 1856). 
On July 9, 2008, the Supreme Court acknowledged the filing of the Third Notice 
of Appeal, and indicated that it had "been filed as an amended notice of appeal in case 
number 20080537 and this case number should be indicated on future filings and 




THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
THE DEFENDANTS ON THE BASIS OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" 
(Emphasis added). 
If there exists any genuine issue of material fact, a motion for summary judgment 
must be denied. Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah at 648, 244 P.2d at 863. See also, Jackson, 
645 P.2d at 615 (A genuine issue of fact exists where on the basis of the facts in the 
record, reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant's conduct measures up to the 
required standard); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 47 
(Utah App. 1988) (In order for a nonmoving party to successfully oppose a motion for 
summary judgment and send the case to a fact-finder, it is not necessary for the party to 
prove its legal theory; it is only necessary that the nonmoving party show "facts" 
controverting the "facts" stated in the moving party's affidavit); Ruffinengo, 579 P.2d at 
343; Billings, 819 P.2d at 803. 
In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court 
gives no deference to any finding by the trial court, Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 779 P.2d 
636; Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112, but essentially reviews the case de novo, being free to 
reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions, Barber, 751 P.2d at 251; Winegar, 813 P.2d 
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at 107, applying the same standard as that applied by the trial court, Durham, 571 P.2d at 
1334; Briggs, 740 P.2d at 283. Because disposition of a case on summary judgment 
denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, the appellate court must review the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the losing party, and may affirm only where it appears that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where, even according to 
the facts as contended by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, Barber, 751 P.2d at 251; Winegar, 813 P.2d at 107. 
In the instant case, the district court found, as a matter of law, that the principles of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel precluded recovery by Plaintiffs. In so doing, the 
district court specifically found that Mrs. Gudmundson "had a complete, full and fair 
hearing before the Utah Labor Commission," (ROA 1812,1845), and that thus summary 
judgment in favor of all defendants was warranted. 
The district court was wrong. As demonstrated below, not only do there exist 
genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment, (a fact conceded by the 
district court in its order granting summary judgment, ROA 1845, fn.l), but the district 
court's interpretation and application of the law to this case was erroneous, thus 
mandating a reversal of the judgment in favor of the defendants, and a remand of the case 
to the district court for a trial on the merits. 
POINTIA. Application of collateral estoppel to the facts of this case violates 
the letter and spirit of the Utah Workers Compensation Act. 
Where, as here, the application of the principles of res judicata or collateral 
estoppel would result in injustice, violate public policy, undermine the policies 
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underlying the "open courts" provision of the Utah constitution and contravene the clear 
mandates of Utah statute, such should be rejected. This principle was addressed at 
length in the 2004 case of Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 99 P.3d 842 (2004), in 
which the issue determined by the court was whether an arbitration decision could stand 
as an adjudication sufficient for collateral estoppel to attach to its findings. In rejecting 
any preclusive effect of an arbitration award, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two distinct theories: claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, f33, 73 P.3d 325 
(citing Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 
1995)). Claim preclusion involves the same parties or their privies and the same 
cause of action. It "'precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have been 
litigated as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action.'" Macris & 
Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, TJ19, 16 P.3d 1214 (quoting Schaer v. State, 
657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted)). In contrast, issue preclusion, 
also known as collateral estoppel, "arises from a different cause of action and 
prevents parties or their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit 
that were fully litigated in the first suit." Id. In effect, once a party has had his or 
her day in court and lost, he or she does not get a second chance to prevail on the 
same issues. Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 1987). In the instant case, 
the deputies argue that the dispute over pay inequities was resolved in the Diamant 
arbitration proceedings, and that collateral estoppel therefore precludes the county 
from relitigating the issue. 
A party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must establish that: (1) the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one presented in the instant 
action; (2) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party, or in 
privity with a party, to the prior adjudication; (3) the issue in the first action was 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) the first suit resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits. Snyder, 2003 UT 13 at Tf35; Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 
1178, 1184 (Utah 1993). 
Application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be unwarranted in 
circumstances where its purposes would not be served. See Estate of Covington v. 
Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). These purposes include: (1) 
preserving the integrity of the judicial system by preventing inconsistent judicial 
outcomes; (2) promoting judicial economy by preventing previously litigated 
issues from being relitigated; and (3) protecting litigants from harassment by 
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vexatious litigation. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); 
State ex rel J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 162-63 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Mel Trimble Real 
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Moreover, collateral estoppel can yield an unjust outcome if applied without 
reasonable consideration and due care. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330-31. In 
particular, allowing a party who took no part in the first suit to take advantage of 
the findings therein and use them offensively in subsequent litigation can result in 
adverse, unjust, and unforeseen consequences for the party against whom 
collateral estoppel has been asserted. Id. at 326-33. Courts, then, must carefully 
consider whether granting preclusive effect to a prior decision is appropriate. Id. at 
330-31. Collateral estoppel "is not an inflexible, universally applicable 
principle[.]... [PJolicy considerations may limit its use where the ... underpinnings 
of the doctrine are outweighed by other factors." Jackson v. City of Sacramento, 
172 Cal. Rptr. 826, 829 (Cal Ct. App. 1981); see also Estate of Covington, 888 
P.2d at 678; Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330-31 (indicating that applying 
collateral estoppel may be unfair where, for example, a party had little incentive to 
defend vigorously, the judgment relied upon is inconsistent with prior judgments, 
or different procedural opportunities are offered in each proceeding). 
Buckner, 2004 UT 78, ffij 11-15, 99 P.3d at 846-847 (emphasis added). 
Here, there was no "complete, full and fair" litigation of Plaintiff Wendy 
Gudmundson's claims before the Utah Labor Commission - a "suit" from which issued a 
"final judgment." Not only are the factual and legal issues in the instant case different 
from those determined in the Labor Commission workers compensation process, but the 
workers compensation statutory scheme in Utah precludes the type of "complete, full and 
fair" litigation that could stand as a bar to a subsequent civil case. 
/. The requirement that the issues in the first trial be identical to those in the 
second case is not met here. 
In the instant case, the first of the four conditions for the application of collateral 
estoppel - that the issues be identical - is missing here. As pointed out above, the Labor 
Commission found that "[t]he petitioner's medical condition was not caused or 
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aggravated by her exposure to ozone ... ." (ROA 283; emphasis added). In affirming 
this decision, the Labor Commission Appeals Board referenced and affirmed the earlier 
decision which "denied Ms. Gudmundson's claim on the grounds that her medical 
problems were not caused or aggravated by her work-related exposure to ozone during 
December 2004," (ROA 357; emphasis added). It appears that there was no 
consideration of nor decision rendered on any possible cause of Mrs. Gudmundson's 
medical problems other than ozone exposure only. 
The instant personal injury case, by contrast, includes evidence that ozone 
exposure was not the only cause of Mrs. Gudmundson's injuries, however. As indicated 
above, evidence has been adduced that exposure to other chemicals, in addition to and in 
combination with the ozone, caused or contributed to her symptoms and problems. Dr. 
Kay H. Kilburn, one of Plaintiffs' experts, (ROA 660), diagnosed Mrs. Gudmundson 
with, inter alia, "Chemical encephalopathy due to ozone and other chemicals? (ROA 
685), specifying that Mrs. Gudmundson's "most disabling problem is profound chemical 
sensitivity that makes ordinary life impossible because she must avoid many scents and 
chemicals and building [sic]." He concluded that this was caused by the combination of 
the ozone exposure and the increased absorption of toxic chemicals: 
The sequence of events is explained best by ozone inhalation producing increased 
absorption of it and the background chemicals: chlorine, phosphoric acid, sodium 
hydroxide, hydrofluorosalic acid-fluorine and resmethrin, a pyrethroid insecticide, 
and detergents that caused intolerance to many chemicals manifested by headache, 
reduced sense of smell, memory loss, dryness of skin and mucous membrane. 
This made Wendy Gudmundson totally and permanently disabled. 
(ROA 686). 
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Another of Plaintiffs experts, Douglas E. Rollins, M.D., Ph.D. stated that Mrs. 
Gudmundson's symptoms and problems originated from the fact that "Wendy 
Gudmundson's exposures to the ozone laundry purification while she worked at the 
Wasatch Laundry facility exposed her to ozone and to the disinfection byproducts 
catalyzed by the ozone. " (ROA 692, emphasis added). 
It is significant that in its Ruling and Order Granting Defendant OzoneSolutions' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, (ROA 1845) the district court conceded that Mrs. 
Gudmundson had produced evidence in contravention of the Labor Commission's 
findings, stating "Ms. Gudmundson apparently now has physician testimony to challenge 
the Commission's determination that her medical issues were not caused by ozone 
exposure." (ROA 1845, fn. 1). Nonetheless, the district court appeared to have been of 
the opinion that since Mrs. Gudmundson had made "no claim that she has taken the 
matter back to the Commission," the district court was somehow precluded from 
considering the fact that the case before the district court was fundamentally different 
from the case that had been presented to the Labor Commission. (The district court cited 
no authority for this assumption, however). Inexplicably, the Ruling and Order then went 
on to simply find that the Plaintiff "had a complete, full and fair hearing" before the 
Labor Commission, which precluded any further consideration of Mrs. Gudmundson's 
claims before the district court. (ROA 1845-1846). 
The fact of the matter is that the issue of causation of Mrs. Gudmundson's medical 
problems applicable to her workers compensation claim is not identical to that issue in 
the present action. In fact, they are not even close - a point the district court recognized. 
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It was thus error for the district court to find that the element of "identical issues" - the 
first criteria upon which a res judicata ruling must rest - was met in this case. 
ii. The Utah Workers Compensation Act was instituted to provide a quick, 
informal remedy for injured Utah workers. 
The Utah Workers Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101 et. seq., was 
instituted in order to assure an injured employee and his family an income during the 
period of his disability from an industrial injury, as well as compensation for any 
resulting permanent disability, and to eliminate the expense, delay and uncertainty of the 
employee having to prove the employer's negligence in court, and to place the burden of 
industrial injuries on industry. It is intended to replace and preempt common law claims 
against employers, in order to afford injured workers a quick, economical and convenient 
forum for the redress of industrial injuries. Wilstead v. Industrial Commission, 407 P.2d 
692,693 (Utah 1965). See also Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 84 Utah 481, 36 P.2d 979 (Utah 1934). The Workers Compensation Act 
provides a "no-fault" type insurance protection scheme for work-related injuries, which is 
intended to entirely replace a worker's ability to seek redress to the courts for claims 
against an employer for industrial injuries: 
The Workers Compensation Act is a comprehensive scheme enacted to provide 
speedy compensation to workers who are injured as a result of an accident 
occurring in the course and scope of their employment, irrespective of negligence 
on the part of employers or employees. The Act basically creates a no-fault type 
insurance protection scheme for work-related injuries in lieu of traditional 
common law tort remedies. Although in some cases, the amount of compensation 
a worker can receive under the Act is more limited than the worker might receive 
in common law damages, compensation is available without regard to fault, is 
more flexible in providing for physical disabilities and loss of wages, medical 
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benefits, and benefits for dependents and survivors, and is provided more speedily 
and generally with less expense. 
The remedies provided by the Act for injuries to workers are exclusive of common 
law remedies. Section 35-1-60 of the Utah Code provides that compensation 
awarded under the Act is "exclusive" and the "liabilities of the employer imposed 
by the Act shall be in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at 
common law or otherwise." That section further provides that "no action at law 
may be maintained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee 
of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or death of an employee." 
Although the Act does not specifically state that no court may award benefits 
provided by the Act, that is its clear import. District courts have no jurisdiction 
whatsoever over cases that fall within the purview of the Workers Compensation 
Act. See Morrill v. J & M Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88, 89 (Utah 1981); Bryan v. 
Utah Int% 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975); Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 
Utah 1, 5, 156 P.2d 885 (1945); Murray v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 
435, 274 P. 940 (1929). They may enforce an award only if it is properly 
docketed. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-59. The court of appeals has power only to 
exercise appellate review of Commission awards, not to make awards itself. Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-86. 
Sheppick v. Albertson's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769, 773-774 (Utah 1996). See also, Vigos v. 
Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, \ 24, 993 P.2d 207,213 ("The purpose of the 
Act is to provide relief from industrial accidents."). 
///. Workers compensation proceedings are far different from and serve 
different purposes than civil litigation. 
To the ends stated above, Workers Compensation proceedings are different than 
civil court proceedings. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Mollerup 
Van Lines v. Adams, 398 P.2d 882, 884-885 (Utah 1965), "[I]t is well to keep in mind 
that this [Workers Compensation] proceeding is different from an ordinary lawsuit in that 
it is not an adversary proceeding. It is purposed to be an impartial inquiry as to whether 
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the applicant is eligible for workmen's compensation." Thus, "neither party is 
necessarily bound by any statement or admission made either in the [panel medical] 
report, or in the testimony of the [commission-appointed] doctor," Id. at 885, and "[t]he 
ordinary rule of res judicata is not applicable to the instant proceeding [to re-open a 
workers compensation case]." Id. at 883. 
Workers Compensation proceedings are, and are intended to be, very informal 
and, in some respects, sui generis. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 59 Utah 46, 
49, 201 P. 1034, 1034 (Utah 1921). The rules of evidence that apply to civil proceedings 
do not apply to Workers Compensation proceedings. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
802(1), "Rules of evidence and procedure before commission - Admissible evidence": 
The commission, the commissioner, an administrative law judge, or the Appeals 
Board, is not bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by 
any technical or formal rules or procedure, other than as provided in this section or 
as adopted by the commission pursuant to this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. The commission may make its investigation in such 
manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of 
the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the chapter. 
From the outset of the institution of the Workers Compensation Act, it has been 
accepted that hearings should be informal in manner, time, and place, in order that a case 
may be processed without the need for a lawyer's assistance. 
There is no attempt to observe the forms of rules which govern judicial trials, and 
the strict and formal rules of judicial procedure are as inapplicable to the form and 
manner of making objections and defenses as they are to the presentation and 
proof of claims for compensation. The main reason back of all of this is to enable 
lay members of society, if necessary, to prosecute proceedings under the Workers 
Compensation Act, with the assistance, if necessary, of the commission. 
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Taslich v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 33, 40, 262 P. 281, 283 (Utah 1927). Thus, 
the procedures governing the filing and handling of a Workers Compensation case are far 
different, and far more informal, than, for example, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See Adjudication of Workers Compensation and Occupational Disease Claims, Utah 
Admin. Code r. 602 (2008). Although some pleadings are required under the rules 
{Application for Hearing, Utah Admin. Code r. 602-2-1(B) (2008) and Answer, Utah 
Admin. Code r. 602-2-1(C) (2008)), and some discovery allowed {see Discovery, Utah 
Admin. Code r. 602-2-1(F) (2008) (interrogatories, document requests, depositions and 
medical examinations - although requests for admissions are not allowed)), the Workers 
Compensation procedures do not contemplate full-scale adversarial litigation. 
All of this accords with the purposes behind the Workers Compensation Act - a 
quick, uncomplicated procedure to help injured workers get help. Consistent therewith, 
and in an apparent attempt to limit the involvement of an attorney, as well as a lengthy 
litigation process, attorney fees at the time of Wendy Gudmundson's hearing were 
capped under Utah Admin. Code r. 602-2-4 (2005) at $125/hr. up to four hours for 
consultation; 20% of weekly benefits up to $24,275; 15% of weekly benefits between 
$24,275 and $48,550, plus 10% of benefits above $48,550, up to a maximum attorney's 
fee of $12,250. Thus, opportunities for the hiring and examination of medical experts 
was, and is, at best, limited for an injured, unemployed and often destitute claimant, and 
the ability to fully cross-examine and challenge testimony is, by definition, severely 
restricted in a Workers Compensation proceeding. 
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As pointed out in the fact section above, most workers compensation applicants do 
not develop a worker's compensation case as they would a personal injury lawsuit, 
because they are most interested in a quick resolution of their claims, in accordance with 
the purposes behind the statute. (ROA 1779). Thus, it is extremely rare for an 
applicant's attorney to take the deposition of a defense doctor. (ROA 1776). Similarly, it 
is rare for an applicant's attorney to hire their own medical expert, due mainly to the 
financial limitations inherent in the workers compensation scheme, as outlined above. 
(ROA 1776). The injured applicant usually has no money to pay for a special expert, and 
often medical insurance coverage issues limit primary medical treatment. Instead of 
expending the time, effort and expense of a full expert work-up of a medical witness -
who would not, in any case, be allowed to testify (ROA 1777-1778) - an applicant's 
attorney is often left with trying to "get a report from whoever is available and willing to 
write a report." (ROA 1777). Where a complex case exists, such as the instant case, in 
which a worker has been exposed to toxins in the workplace, counsel for the applicant 
may not have all of the information or medical work up that they would like. 
Nonetheless, most clients simply press the attorney to move forward with the worker's 
compensation matter because of their financial circumstances. Often the worker and the 
attorney "just have to hope for the best when the case gets before a medical panel." 
(ROA 1779). 
/v. The workers compensation scheme does not anticipate nor provide a "full 
and fair" lawsuit resulting in a "final judgment on the merits" that 
precludes a subsequent third-party suit. 
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As pointed out above, neither the statutes, the administrative rules nor the case law 
anticipates or provides that a Workers Compensation proceeding constitutes a complete, 
full and fair litigation, resulting in di final judgment on the merits that would preclude a 
subsequent third-party suit. (Two of the elements for collateral estoppel; Buckner, 2004 
UT 78, f 13, 99 P.3d at 847). In fact, the cases setting forth the requirements for 
collateral estoppel require that the "first action" whose decision is to be applied in the 
second case should be a "suit" that "resulted in a final judgment on the merits." Id.; see 
also Snyder, 2003 UT 13 at fflf 34-35, 73 P.3d 325, 332 ("the claim that is alleged to be 
barred must have been presented in the first suit or be one that could and should have 
been raised in the first action ... the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on 
the merits," quoting Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, 44 P.3d 663 (2002) and 
Maoris & Assoc, v. Neways, 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214 (2000). 
Such a requirement is not fulfilled in a workers compensation case. To the 
contrary, the sole purpose of Workers Compensation administrative proceeding (not 
lawsuit) is to determine whether a worker qualifies for benefits - nothing more. 
Mollerup Van Lines, 398 P.2d 882. The only "issue" before a Workers Compensation 
board is a worker's qualification for benefits under the unique and preemptive Workers 
Compensation scheme. There is no "suit"; there is only an application for a hearing. 
There is no "trial," in which the applicant is allowed to cross-examine adverse medical 
witnesses; there is only an administrative review of a cold medical report. There is no 
right to a jury of one's peers; there is only an administrative law judge. There is no 
opportunity for full exploration of all issues pertinent to an applicant's claims of injury; 
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there is only an abbreviated "hearing" that is limited to two hours - most of which is 
taken up by the applicant's testimony, and in which neither the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure nor the Utah Rules of Evidence apply (as they would in a lawsuit). Finally, 
there is no "judgment"; there is only an administrative determination as to whether 
benefits will be granted. 
v. The Utah Workers Compensation Act expressly permits a separate action 
against a third party - not a bar against such an action. 
The fact that workers compensation is the exclusive remedy an injured worker has 
against an employer does not mean that it is that an injured worker's exclusive remedy 
against anyone. To the contrary, the Workers Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-106, provides that an injured employee may sue a third party "[w]hen any injury 
or death for which compensation is payable under this chapter ... is caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of a person other than an employer, officer agent or employee of 
the employer ... ." 
In this regard, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that because the 
purposes behind the Workers Compensation Act are different from those in a civil action, 
determinations in Workers Compensation proceedings are not to be given the res judicata 
effect of a judgment: 
The [Workers Compensation] Act is a humanitarian and economical system 
designed to provide relief to the victims of industrial accidents: 
"The Workers Compensation Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme that 
provides remedies for injuries to workers occurring in the course of their 
employment, irrespective of fault, in lieu of common law tort actions. The 
Act provides temporary total disability benefits, § 35-1-65; temporary 
partial disability benefits, § 35-1-65.1; permanent partial and permanent 
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total disability benefits, § 35-1-81; and medical expenses for injured 
employees, § 35-1-81, as well as certain other benefits. These remedies, 
whether viewed individually or together, are not analogous to an ordinary 
lump-sum judgment that the common law provides for personal injury 
actions. Not only may benefits be paid over a period of time rather than in a 
lump-sum judgment, but an award of benefits does not generally have the 
res judicata effect of a judgment." 
Stoker v. Workers Comp. Fund & Indus. Comm% 889 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1994). 
"To give effect to that purpose, the Act should be liberally construed and applied 
to provide coverage. Any doubt respecting the right of compensation will be 
resolved in favor of the injured employee.ff State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial 
Comm% 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984); see also Olsen v. Mclntyre, 956 P.2d 
257, 260 (Utah 1998) ("This court construes workers compensation statutes 
liberally in favor of finding employee coverage."). 
Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel, 965 P.2d 583, 585 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added). 
See also Stoker v. Workers Comp. Fund & Indus. Comm'n, 889 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 
1994). 
Under the district court's erroneous reading of the law in this case, however, the 
findings of the Utah Labor Commission denying Wendy Gudmundson's Workers 
Compensation application are forever etched in stone as against everyone - including 
third parties - and have preclusive collateral estoppel effect against her as well as her 
husband, (who was not a party to the Workers Compensation proceeding). This 
conclusion not only flies in the face of the clear statutory and administrative mandates set 
forth above but, in practice, defeats the entire purpose behind the Workers Compensation 
statutory scheme. 
vi. By forcing an injured worker to make an election of remedies of either 
workers compensation or third-party litigation, the district court's 
erroneous reading of the law defeats the purposes behind the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act. 
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Under the district court's erroneous interpretation of the law, in every case in 
which a potential claim against a non-employer third party exists, the injured worker 
would be forced to make an exclusive election as to which remedy to pursue - either a 
claim against the employer under the Workers Compensation statutes (in which the 
worker could secure immediate compensation for medical bills and lost wages) or a 
lengthier, although possibly more remunerative third-party civil action against the non-
employer. From a practical standpoint, the employee could not elect both remedies, since 
by undertaking the Workers Compensation claim, the worker would risk a final, adverse 
decision that would forever preclude the third-party lawsuit. No longer could the 
purposes of the Workers Compensation statutes be fulfilled - to quickly and efficiently 
make a determination of a worker's eligibility for workers compensation benefits under a 
limited, abbreviated and sui generis claim process. Instead, in the event that a worker 
decided to pursue a claim in the Workers Compensation system, it would, by necessity, 
be full-scale, scorched-earth combat. The worker simply could not afford to lose the 
claim. The stakes would be too high. 
Under these circumstances, even if the employee were to win in a Workers 
Compensation proceeding, the worker would only have won the ability to shield his claim 
from dismissal in a subsequent third-party lawsuit. The worker would not have won the 
ability to use his Workers Compensation win as a sword in that subsequent third-party 
action. This would essentially give the non-employer third-party two chances to avoid 
risk; first, if the worker loses before the Workers Compensation board, and second, if the 
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worker wins in Workers Compensation and is defended against in the subsequent suit 
against the third party. 
The only way for the injured worker to avoid the result described above would be 
to either 1) litigate the third-party claim first and wait until it has been ultimately decided 
before bringing the Workers Compensation action - if the statute of limitations hasn't run 
by that time - or 2) simply skip the Workers Compensation process altogether. Neither 
one of these options is optimal for the injured worker (who needs medical bills and wage 
compensation paid immediately), and both would undermine the entire purpose behind 
the Workers Compensation scheme - to provide "a humanitarian and economical system 
designed to provide relief to the victims of industrial accidents," Burgess, 965 P.2d at 858 
to "provide remedies for injuries to workers occurring in the course of their employment, 
irrespective of fault, in lieu of common law tort actions," Stoker, 889 P.2d at 411, and to 
afford injured workers a quick, economical and convenient forum for the redress of 
industrial injuries. Wilstead, 407 P.2d at 693. Instead, application of the district court's 
decision to workers compensation cases leads to exactly the type of combative and 
adversarial process that the Workers Compensation statutes were designed to avoid. 
POINT IB. Because the district court9s decision violates the Open Courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution, it must he rejected. 
Article I, Section 11, clause 19 of the Utah Constitution - the "open courts" 
provision- provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
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from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
According to the early Utah Supreme Court case of Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 
31, 151 P. 366 (Utah 1915), that provision was specifically intended to place "a limitation 
upon the Legislature to prevent that branch of the state government from closing the 
doors of the courts against any person who has a legal right which is enforceable in 
accordance with some known remedy." Id. at 366-367. Subsequent Utah Supreme Court 
cases have indicated that the clause provides both procedural and substantive guarantees. 
As to procedural guarantees, the courts have determined that the clause provides "access 
to the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality." Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft, 111 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). The substantive guarantee is that "an 
individual cannot be arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to protect basic 
individual rights." Id. 
While most cases addressing the "open courts" provision deal specifically with the 
question of whether the Utah legislature's passage of any particular piece of legislation 
deprives Utah residents of their procedural and substantive rights to redress to the courts, 
a review of those cases reveals that the policy undergirding the "open courts" 
jurisprudence in Utah is, in essence, this: if a citizen's remedy to the courts is taken away 
or diminished, there must either be an evil that is being remedied in a reasonable way, or 
there must be a reasonable alternative. See Glen E. Roper, An Open Question in Utah ys 
Open Courts Jurisprudence: The Utah Wrongful Life Act and Wood v. University of Utah 
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Medical Center, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 893, 898 (Comprehensive review of Utah "open 
courts" decisions). 
As discussed at length above, under the district court's interpretation of the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act, a claimant is precluded from her day in court in a separate 
third-party action - an action anticipated and recognized in the Utah Worker's 
Compensation Act in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106 - if she loses her workers 
compensation claim. The Act would thus have the effect of requiring that any injured 
worker make an exclusive election of remedies - to either avail herself of the exclusive 
remedies of the Workers Compensation Act against the employer, Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-105, or the civil litigation remedies against the non-employer third party,Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-106, but not both. This equates to a deprivation of the worker's right 
to access to the courts for redress of her injuries, without any compelling reason therefore 
and without any reasonable alternative. The injured worker is thereby "barred from 
prosecuting ... before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, [a] civil cause to 
which [s]he is a party." Utah Const, art. I, § 11, clause 19. She cannot receive full 
compensation for her injuries as against all of the parties liable for those injuries, despite 
the clear intention of the Workers Compensation Act that she be allowed to do so. For all 
intents and purposes, either the courthouse doors or the administrative tribunal's doors 
are closed to her. She can't walk through both. Her right to access to the courts is thus 
denied. 
The district court's reading of the statute should be rejected out of hand, in that it 
flies in the face of the plain and unambiguous language of the Workers Compensation 
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Act. See State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 78, \ 7, 31 P.3d 528, 529 (2001) (When construing 
statutory language, the court need look no further than the plain language of the statute 
unless there exists some ambiguity). Even if there existed ambiguity in the statute, 
(which there is not), the court must read that language in such a way that it renders the 
statute neither superfluous nor inoperative {State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, f 9, 150 P.3d 
540, 542 (2006); State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, % 10, 44 P.3d 680, 685 (2002); Hall 
v. State Dept. of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, ^ 15, 24 P.3d 958, 963 (2001)), nor 
unreasonable nor impractical. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(rejecting unreasonable application of statute of limitations for filing habeas corpus 
petition under Open Courts provision of the Utah constitution); Tanner v. Phoenix 
Insurance Co., 799 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In the instant case, the district court has unreasonably read the Workers 
Compensation Act in such a way as to render Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106 superfluous 
and inoperative once a workers compensation determination has been made with regard 
to causation of injury - a reading that flies in the face of the Utah Constitution's Open 
Courts provision and common sense. Here, Wendy Gudmundson, the injured worker, has 
been denied her access to the civil courts by the Utah Workers Compensation Act, as 
defined and adjudged by the district court. For that reason, it is clear that the district 
court's judgment was wrong and should be overturned. 
POINT IC. Application of collateral estoppel to the facts of this case is 
manifestly unjust. 
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As pointed out above, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that 
"[amplication of the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be unwarranted in circumstances 
where its purposes would not be served" and that "collateral estoppel can yield an unjust 
outcome if applied without reasonable consideration and due care." Buckner, 2004 UT 
78, ffl| 14-15, 99 P.3d at 846-847. Where an injustice may occur through the application 
of the principle, it should be rejected. "In particular, allowing a party who took no part in 
the first suit to take advantage of the findings therein and use them offensively in 
subsequent litigation can result in adverse, unjust, and unforeseen consequences for the 
party against whom collateral estoppel has been asserted. Courts, then, must carefully 
consider whether granting preclusive effect to a prior decision is appropriate. Collateral 
estoppel 'is not an inflexible, universally applicable principle. ... [P]olicy considerations 
may limit its use where the ... underpinnings of the doctrine are outweighed by other 
factors.'" Id. (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, application of the principle of collateral estoppel results in a 
manifest injustice. Wendy Gudmundson will be permanently barred from her day in 
court because of the draconian imposition on her unrelated third-party lawsuit of an 
administrative decision, to which none of the defendant/appellees, (nor, for that matter, 
plaintiff Kay Gudmundson), was a party. Her chance to be heard in a fair and impartial 
judicial forum will be crushed. Her ability to fully develop her case, with adequate time, 
resources and care devoted to the prosecution of her claim will be foreclosed forever. As 
a matter of simple fairness and justice, then, the district court's misapplication of the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel must be rejected. 
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POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT BECAUSE 
"PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT DEL 
OZONE'S GENERATOR WAS DEFECTIVE," DEL OZONE WAS ENTITLED 
TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In its order of March 24, 2008, the district court found that "Plaintiffs have failed 
to produce evidence that Del Ozone's ozone generator was defective." In this regard, the 
district court also denied Plaintiffs' request for additional discovery under Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(f), stating that they had failed to establish that they had been unable to submit 
evidence. The district court erred with regard to both findings. Each will be discussed in 
turn below. 
POINT2A. The district court erred in denying Plaintiffs' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) 
motion for additional time to adduce evidence in opposition to Del 
Ozone's motion for summary judgment. 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot 
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may 
make such other order as is just. 
In applying Rule 56(f), the Utah courts have stated "Rule 56(f) motions opposing a 
summary judgment motion on the ground that discovery has not been completed should 
be granted liberally unless they are deemed dilatory or lacking in merit." Energy 
Management Services LLC v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 90, {^10, 110 P.3d 158, 160 (2005) 
(citing Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Coop., Inc., 2002 UT 39, \ 24, 48 P.3d 
910): 
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[W]hen a party timely presents an affidavit under rule 56(f) stating reasons why 
it is unable to proffer an evidentiary affidavit in opposition to its opponent's 
motion for summary judgment, the trial court's discretion is invoked. Unless the 
court finds the affidavit "dilatory or lacking in merit, the motion should be 
liberally treated." 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 893 (citing Cox v. 
Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 312-13 (Utah 1984) (additional citation omitted). 
Further, "Rule 56(f) motions should be granted liberally and that inasmuch as an 
adequate opportunity for discovery ha[s] not been provided, the motion for summary 
judgment should be adjourned pending the completion of such discovery." Cox, 678 P.2d 
at 315; see also Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
A rule 56(f) motion has merit when it targets core issues that might defeat the 
pending summary judgment motion. Energy Management Services LLC, 2005 UT App. 
90, Tf 11, 110 P.3d at 161(citing Western Dairymen Coop., Inc., 2002 UT 39, \ 24, 48 
P.3d910). 
In this case, all of the relevant factors militated in favor of allowing additional 
discovery under Rule 56(f). 
The reasons stated in the opposition to Del Ozone's motion for summary 
judgment, referenced and adopted in the affidavit of Plaintiffs' counsel, were 
certainly adequate under Rule 56(f). New counsel entered appearances on August 28, 
2007. Fact discovery then concluded on September 5, 2007 - eight days later. Plaintiffs' 
new counsel, in a short time, had uncovered new and provable theories as to Wendy's 
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injuries and requested that the district court exercise its discretion and grant time to flesh 
those theories out. The information sought by Plaintiffs' counsel, set forth in the 
Opposition, was specific and would have defeated summary judgment in Del Ozone's 
favor. As pointed out above in the factual summary hereto, Plaintiffs sought further 
discovery on, inter alia, 1) the interpretation of Mrs. Gudmundson's MRIs, taken in 
December, 2004, June, 2006 and again in August, 2006; 2) information on the 
neurotoxicity or carcinogenic effects of an ozone water disinfectant system; 3) 
information on water being pulled from a geo-thermal well below the Utah State Prison 
which had not been metered or quantified, as required by an EPA water permit (ROA 
387); and 4) further information from Del Ozone relating to Del Ozone's denial of 
whether any of its "instruments that are similar to the Device in question [the ozone 
generator at the Utah State Prison] have ever been known to cause a health problem as a 
result of the use or improper use of said similar device," in response to interrogatories 
from Plaintiffs. (ROA 388). Plaintiffs also pointed out that they needed to take the 
depositions of various Del Ozone personnel, including Rick Salter, Jim White and Joel 
Peterson, or compel documents to supplement Del Ozone's inadequate and deficient 
answers to interrogatories and document requests. (ROA 392-393). 
Furthermore, it was clear that Plaintiffs' counsels' request for additional discovery 
was no "fishing expedition." In a teleconference held on October 10, 2007, every party to 
this lawsuit, but one, agreed that additional time was necessary to conduct both fact and 
expert discovery. (See ROA 534). 
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This case thus closely resembles the situation found in Strand v. Associated Students 
of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977), in which the Supreme Court of Utah, quoting 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, stated: 
The case must, therefore, go back for further proceedings as to this cause of action 
in order to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to produce evidence of the facts 
necessary to support the relief for which they ask. It is obvious that this evidence 
must come largely from the defendants. This case illustrates the danger of 
founding a judgment in favor of one party upon his own version of facts within his 
sole knowledge as set forth in affidavits prepared ex parte. Cross-examination 
of the party and a reasonable examination of his records by the other party 
frequently bring forth further facts which place a very different light upon the 
picture. The plaintiffs should, therefore, be given a reasonable opportunity, under 
proper safeguards, to take the depositions and have the discovery which they 
seek.... 
Id. at 193. 
It is thus clear that the district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' 
Rule 56(f) motion. This is evidenced by two points. First, the district court was dead 
wrong in its conclusion that Plaintiff had had "two and a half years" to "uncover any 
available evidence to support their claims." (ROA 1812). In actuality, less than two years 
had elapsed between the time the complaint had been filed and the date that Del Ozone's 
motion for summary judgment had been filed. Second, the district court appeared to have 
discounted and belittled the fact that Plaintiffs claimed that they needed additional time 
because they had only recently found new counsel willing to go forward on their case -
less than two weeks before Del Ozone filed its motion for summary judgment. In a hand-
written note - one among many written in the margins of the Plaintiffs opposition to Del 
Ozone's motion for summary judgment - Judge Lindberg responded to the assertion that 
"Plaintiffs recently retained new counsel and, therefore, need additional time to perform 
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fact and expert discovery" by replying, "Too bad - Ct. unlikely to grant a 3r extension on 
this case where P's have been represented by competent counsel throughout case & 
discovery has proceeded w/o interruption." 
As important as a district court's scheduling order may be to the orderly progress 
of a case, such should not trump the importance of allowing a plaintiff, who has only 
recently had the opportunity to hire new counsel, to find and produce sufficient evidence 
to defeat a summary judgment against her. Under these circumstances, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the district court to preclude Wendy and Kay Gudmundson from adducing 
all evidence necessary to defeat Del Ozone's summary judgment motion based its 
assertion that it had "no duty" to them. 
POINT 2B. The district court erred in determining that Plaintiffs had failed to 
introduce evidence that Del Ozone's ozone generator was defective. 
In its motion for summary judgment, Del Ozone argued that there was no basis 
upon which any duty could be imposed on Del Ozone and further, that the ozone 
generator was not defective. (ROA 231-234). 
At oral argument on the motion, the district court rejected Del Ozone's argument 
that "the connection between its role as a manufacturer of the ozone system is so 
attenuated to the injury of the worker in this case, Ms. Gudmundson, that it was 
unforeseeable." The court did, however, agree with Del Ozone that "the plaintiff 
presented no evidence that the ozone generator was defective." (ROA 1889:6). This 
finding was formalized in the district court's order of March 24, 2008, which stated, 
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"Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence that Del Ozone's ozone generator was 
defective." The district court was wrong in this finding, and should be overturned. 
Although it was crucial that Plaintiff be allowed further discovery under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(f) in order to adduce evidence to dispute Del Ozone's summary judgment 
motion, (see above), Plaintiff did provide evidence that the ozone disinfection laundry 
system, designed in corroboration with Del Ozone (the manufacturer of key components), 
was unreasonably dangerous due to a defective condition. The ozone generator did not 
include an ambient air monitor, for example, nor did it have an automatic shut off valve 
that would automatically engage if pollutant levels exceeded EPA or OSHA limits. (ROA 
559:70). (In fact, uncontroverted evidence adduced by Plaintiffs show that tests 
demonstrated that pollutant levels ultimately did exceed EPA and OSHA levels even after 
ventilation was installed - ROA 590; ROA 592-593; ROA 595-599). Plaintiff further 
produced evidence that Del Ozone was informed through the purchase order that the 
ozone generator and other key Del Ozone components was to be shipped to "Utah 
Department] 0[f] Corrections], Draper Prison, 14425 Bitter Brush Lane, Draper, Utah 
84020." (ROA 601). 
Given this, it is clear that the trier of fact could certainly determine that Del Ozone 
sold defective components into the stream of commerce, and that Del Ozone was aware 
of the installation of these defective products at the Utah State Prison. Construing these 
facts in the light most favorable to Mrs. Gudmundson, the district court should have 
denied Del Ozone's motion for summary judgment on this ground and allowed the case 
to be tried on the merits. 
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In this connection, it should be noted that Mrs. Gudmundson was also entitled 
to a construction of the evidence that would allow her to overcome by a 
preponderance of the evidence the presumption of nondefectiveness in Utah Code 
section 78-15-6(3). See Egbert v. Nissan N Am., Inc., 2007 UT 64, If 14, 167 P.3d 1058, 
1062 (Utah 2007). In light of the facts adduced by Plaintiffs, it cannot be reasonably 
asserted that there exist no circumstances under which Mrs. Gudmundson could prevail. 
The summary judgment was thus erroneously granted against her. Bridge v. Backman, 353 
P.2d 909 (Utah 1960). 
POINT III. 
THIS APPEAL IS TIMELY. 
By order dated September 22, 2008, this Court has invited the parties to address 
the issue of the timeliness of the appeal, and the jurisdictional issues implicated in a 
"motion to clarify" filed by Del Ozone and joined by Johnson Controls. For the reasons 
set forth below, it is clear that the appeal in this case was timely as to all claims and all 
parties. 
The June 4, 2008 (Second) Notice of Appeal from the district court's final 
judgment issued May 28, 2008 was timely as to all parties and issues in this case. 
Utah R. App. P. 4(a), which sets forth the 30-day appeal period for an appeal as of 
right, goes to appeals "from final judgment and order." The docketing statement for an 
appeal involving multiple parties, as is this case, requires that a statement contain a 
statement that "the judgment has been certified as a final judgment by the trial court 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Rule 54(b) provides 
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that a district court may only direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties "upon an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." 
Where this is not done, the rule provides that the action is not terminated "as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all 
the parties." 
Here, there was no express determination in the order of March 24, 2008 (ROA 
1813; Appendix A hereto), prepared by counsel for Del Ozone, that there was "no just 
reason for delay," nor "an express direction for the entry of judgment." Neither was there 
any language indicating that the order constituted a final judgment. Accordingly, the 
First Notice of Appeal (ROA 1815) - Appellate Case No. 20080320 - was premature, 
and was properly dismissed as such. Here, the "final judgment" was not entered by the 
district court until May 28, 2008, in which the district court specifically incorporated its 
analysis pertinent to its earlier (non-final) order of March 24, 2008 (ROA 1813), and 
stated that that Ruling and Order "shall constitute the final Order of the Court on this 
matter" and that "no further Order need be submitted by the parties." (ROA 1845-1846; 
Appendix B hereto)(emphasis added). Importantly, the district court indicated in the May 
28, 2008 order that it had considered - and rejected - amendment or entry of an order 
contrary to its previous order, stating "Nevertheless [despite Plaintiffs' 'more complete 
analysis' in new argument] the Court is not persuaded to amend its decision or to enter an 
order contrary to its previous order and judgment." This is clearly indicative that the 
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court did not consider the previous order a final and appealable order, but instead 
"subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims 
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). (ROA 1845). 
Thus, the appeal from the May 28, 2008 order, filed seven days later - the Second Notice 
of Appeal - went to the final judgment of the court, including all aspects of the case and 
all parties thereto. (ROA 1848). It was timely, and included all defendant/appellees. The 
Third Notice of Appeal - the "abundance of caution" filing - was thus unnecessary, but 
nonetheless preserved all rights of the Plaintiffs/Appellants in the case. It was properly 
accepted by the Supreme Court as an amended notice of appeal. 
In any case, the appeal is timely, and goes to all issues and all parties in the 
underlying proceeding; Del Ozone, Johnson Controls, Inc. and OzoneSolutions, L.C. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs/Appellants request that this Court 
overturn the district court's order of summary judgment and remand this case for a trial 
on the merits. 
DATED this A^-nday of October, 2008. 
RANDALL K. EDWARDS, PLLC 
LUNDELL & LOFGREN, P.C. 
RaAdall K. Edwards 
Rick S. Lundell 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Ruling and Order Granting Defendant OzoneSolutions' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, dated May 28,2008 (ROA 1845) 
B. Order Granting Summary Judgment as to Del Ozone and Johnson Controls, 
dated March 24, 2008 (ROA 1811-1814) 
W U » BISTRICT COURT 
Thrrd Judicial District 
Joseph E. Minnock (Bar No. 6281) 
Sara Becker (Bar No. 10277) 
Morgan, Minnock, Rice & James, L.C. 
Kearns Building, Suite 800 
136 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant, Johnson Controls, Inc. 
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DEL OZONE, OZONESOLUTIONS, L.C, 
JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC., et. al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 050916518 
Judge Denise Lindberg 
The following motions, being duly noticed, were presented for oral argument on March 3, 
2008, at 2:30 p.m.: (1) Plaintiffs' motion for additional time pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f), (2) 
Del Ozone's motion for summary judgment, and (3) Johnson Controls' motion for summary 
judgment. Having heard oral argument and reviewed all memoranda and supporting papers 
pertaining to these motions, including plaintiffs' supplemental memorandum in opposition to 
summary judgment, and having independently reviewed the relevant case law and statutes, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
WA\ 
1. Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they have been unable to submit evidence 
to oppose summary judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). This case was filed on 
September 20, 2005 and the Court has granted multiple extensions to allow for further discovery. 
On October 10,2006, the Court granted a Stipulation and Proposed order for Amended Case 
Management Order. On June 6, 2007, the Court granted a Second Amended Case Management 
Order and on February 1, 2008, the plaintiffs moved to modify the Second Amended Case 
Management Order. Plaintiffs have had two-and-a-half years to obtain the necessary evidence to 
oppose summary judgment, which the Court finds to have been more than adequate to uncover 
any available evidence to support their claims. The Court further finds that plaintiffs have failed 
to identify the specific facts that are within the defendants' exclusive knowledge, the steps that 
they have taken to obtain that information, and how that information would help them respond to 
defendants' motions for summary judgment. For these reasons, plaintiffs' motion for additional 
time under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) is hereby DENIED; 
2. Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence that Del Ozone's ozone generator was 
defective. Therefore, Del Ozone's motion for summary judgment on this ground is hereby 
GRANTED; 
3. Plaintiffs are precluded from pursuing their claim for injuries caused by exposure 
to ozone or related byproducts by the doctrine of issue preclusion. Plaintiff had a complete, full 
and fair hearing before the Utah Labor Commission. Plaintiff was provided notice of the 
hearing, allowed to present her arguments, represented by counsel, allowed to conduct discovery, 
and allowed to have her case evaluated by a medical panel. The Utah Labor Commission's 
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Order dated October 2, 2006 found that plaintiffs symptoms were not the result of exposure to 
ozone, but rather caused by her Chiari 1 malformation, the identical issue of causation upon 
which plaintiffs' present claims hinge. For these reasons, the elements of issue preclusion have 
been satisfied and Del Ozone's and Johnson Controls' motions for summary judgment on this 
ground are hereby GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /2rday of March, 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid to 
the following: 
Rick S. Lundell 
Brian K. Lofgren 
LUNDELL & LOFGREN, P.C. 
136 South Main Street, Ste 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Randall K. Edwards, PLLC 
136 Main St., Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
John R. Lund 
R. Scott Young 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for Del Ozone 
Heinz J. Mahler 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
10 Exchange Place #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Ozone Solutions 
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DEL OZONE, OZONESOLUTIONS, L.C., 
JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC., et. al, 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT OZONESOLUTIONS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 050916518 
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg 
Date: May 28, 2008 
fl This matter is before the Court on Defendant Ozonesolutions, L.C.'s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. After considering the parties' submissions the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion. 
1(2 In a prior summary judgment motion brought by Defendant Del Ozone, the Court ruled that 
"Plaintiffs are precluded from pursuing their claims for injuries caused by exposure to ozone or 
related byproducts by the doctrine of issue preclusion. Plaintiff had a complete, full and fair hearing 
before Utah Labor Commission. . . ." See Order Granting Summary Judgment, dated March 24, 
2008. Based on its prior analysis the Court concludes it must similarly grant Ozonesolutions' present 
motion. 
P To be sure, Plaintiffs have now presented a more complete analysis in opposition to 
Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by res judicata. Nevertheless, the Court 
is not persuaded to amend its decision or to enter an order contrary to its previous order and 
judgment. Plaintiff has cited cases in which the appellate court determined that res judicata did not 
apply because of the nature of the proceedings and the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission 
to revise its decisions. See, e.g., Mollerup Van Lines v. Adams, 398 P.2d 882 (Utah 1965). Be that 
as it may, Plaintiffs have not provided evidence that Ms. Gudmundson challenged the Commission's 
Order, or that she has asked the Commission to exercise its continuing jurisdiction to amend its 
previous Order. Additionally, they have not demonstrated that Ms. Gudmundson would be entitled 
to an amended order from the Commission.! See Burgess v Siaperas Sand & Gravel, 965 P.2d 583, 
587 (Utah App. 1998) (finding that the Commission must have a basis to reopen a claim and exercise 
its continuing jurisdiction provided by "evidence of some significant change or new development 
]Ms. Gudmundson apparently now has physician testimony to challenge the Commission's 
determination that her medical issues were not caused by ozone exposure. However, there is no 
claim that she has taken the matter back to the Commission. 
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in the claimant's injury or proof of the previous award's inadequacy." (citations and quotations 
omitted)). This, coupled with the fact that the Court has already determined that the Commission's 
procedures were sufficiently trial-like to say that the issue in the first action was ''completely, fully, 
and fairly litigated" {see Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, [^27, 110 
P.3d 687), persuades the Court that this Defendant, much like Del Ozone, is entitled to summary 
judgment on res judicata grounds. The Court hereby incorporates by reference its prior analysis as 
reflected in the Del Ozone summary judgment. 
This Ruling and Order shall constitute the final Order of the Court on this matter. No further 
Order need be submitted by the parties. 
DATED this^day of May, 2008. 
\WJ> 
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